The paper contrasts Lipset's modernization hypothesis and Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis that entries into democracy are random with respect to income. We use data on income and democracy going back to 1820, multiple definitions of democracy, and non-parametric testing focusing on the distribution of entrants' incomes. We find that income matters for entry into higher levels of democracy; but if we control for the previously achieved level of democracy, the income effect vanishes. This means that countries that enter into higher levels of democracy are not a random draw from the universe of all country incomes but are a random draw from the joint distribution of previous level of democracy and income. These results are compatible with the presence of a subgroup of (low) income and (low) democracy countries from which recruitment into democracy is seldom made. But for other countries, accession to higher levels of democracy is incomerandom. Income seems therefore both to matter (probably explaining why poor countries cannot improve their democracy levels) and not matter (explaining why for other countries improvements in democracy are income-random).
The objective
The objective of this paper is to empirically assess the validity of the Przeworski and Limongi hypothesis (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 1997; Przeworski 2004) according to which entries into democracy are determined by non-economic factors and hence random with respect to level of development. This hypothesis is set in explicit opposition to the standard Lipset hypothesis, formulated in the 1950s (Lipset, 1959 (Lipset, , 1960 , according to which increased income associated with rising educational attainment and growing share of the middle class "naturally" leads to demand for democracy. Thus, income to largely "causes" the emergence of democracy. We test the two hypotheses using the two large and recently created databases which more or less cover the period from 1820 to 2000. They are Angus Maddison's (2004) series on economic growth and population and PolityIV data on democracy. We are thus able to test the two hypotheses using very rich data on income and democracy covering the entire period of modern history. The advantage of extending the period back in time is that both income and democracy variability was less then. If the sample starts in 1950 or 1960, there is a bias, noted by Boix and Stokes (2003, p. 10 ) that poor countries are overwhelmingly dictatorships and rich countries democracies: an empirical approach must account for that systematic difference and not assume it away.
We are employing mostly non-parametric techniques which, in this context, have not been used before. We are also concerned only with the narrow issue regarding entries into democracy and level of income, not with a more complicated one of whether better performing or richer economies are able to sustain democracy longer. 2 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis and reviews empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the data and gives descriptive statistics.
Section 4 is the core of the paper: it empirically tests the hypotheses. The last section presents the conclusions.
A short discussion of the Lipset and Przeworski-Limongi hypotheses
According to the well-known Lipset's modernization theory increasing average income implies a more sizable and more educated middle class which tends to demand greater political rights thus ultimately leading to the emergence of democracy. In this view of the world, rising income or development is causally linked with political democracy. The experiences of Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, Greece and more recently Eastern Europe and the USSR lend plausibility to this view. The
Lipset hypothesis implies what we may call "a substantive endogeneity" between income and democracy. O'Donnell (1973) and by Przeworski (2004, p. 492) implies two distinct statements: first, democracies are more likely to survive in rich countries, and second, as countries get richer they are likely to evolve into democracies. The first statement is, according to Przeworski, true, the second false. In this paper, we are interested in the second statement only. 3 Boix and Stokes (2003) who extend Lipset's theory call it a theory of "endogenous democratization".
An alternative theory is formulated by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) . Przeworski and Limongi hold that emergence of democracy responds to non-economic factors but that democracies are more durable at high income levels. 4 If the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis were true, we would tend to observe in the data a greater prevalence of democracies among rich countries but there would be no substantive "endogeneity" between income and democracy but merely a "statistical" association, or as Przeworski and Limongi call it, the relationship between the two would be "exogenous.". Clearly, the two hypotheses imply two very different views of the world and role of development in fostering democracy:
democracy is either contingent on non-economic factors or is a product of development. Barro (1996) does one of the early econometric testings of the Lipset hypothesis and concludes that "propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP." Barro's approach consists in running a democracy regression with the right-hand side variables that include two lagged democracy values (five-and ten-year lags) and a number of control variables, the most important of which is income. The idea is that the level of democracy gradually converges to the level implied by the control variables. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the income variable is interpreted to mean that there is the predicted causality running from income to democracy. Barro's data are five-year averages 4 "We would…expect democracies to appear randomly with regard to development, but to die in poorer countries and survive in wealthier ones." (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997. p. 157 ). Democracy appears in response to political contingencies. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) for the period after 1950 with Maddison's (1995) data for the period before 1950. 6 Both sets of authors do parametric testing of the alternative hypotheses. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) reject the strong formulation 5 Przeworski and Limongi define dictatorship as where at least one of the following conditions holds: (1) executive leader is not elected, (2) legislature is not elected. (3) there is no more than one party, (4) even if none of the previous three rules holds, the regime refuses to yield power. Boix and Stokes (2003) use a Boix and Rosato (2001) definition of democracy which requires that elections be free and competitive, the executive be accountable to either citizens (in presidential systems) or to an elected legislature (in parliamentary systems) and that at least 50 percent of male electorate is eligible to vote. 6 The combination is an odd one; it is unclear why one single source (Maddison) was not used throughout. Even if the correlation between the two sources is high (as reported by the authors in footnote 10, p. 11), it does not mean that income levels for the same country move seamlessly between the two sources. It is also unclear how the authors have "adjusted" the Maddison dataset to make it "comparable with the Summers-Heston dataset" (p.11).
of the Lipset hypothesis. 7 Boix and Stokes (2003) , on the contrary, accept the Lipset hypothesis, and find it to hold particularly strongly in the pre-1950 period.
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The current paper differs in three respects from Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Boix and Stokes (2003) Boix and Stokes (p. 12) argue is the diminishing marginal effect of development on democracy-namely, that while the probability of transition to democracy goes up with income, the rate at which this probability increases gets smaller with higher income. The merging of the two data sets is more difficult than it might appear at first sight. This is because the approaches of Maddison and Polity IV differ in an important respect. Maddison takes, with a few exceptions, as his starting point the currently existing countries and tries to trace historical per capita income on the territory of the countries as they currently are. Thus, for example, Maddison's data (generally) aim to present GDI per capita of the populations that were living on the current territory of Germany or Austria or Russia regardless of the fact that these countries might have been larger or smaller at given historical dates.
PolityIV data sets takes the opposite, legalistic, approach. It considers as its unit of analysis a "polity" (country) that is a member of the inter-state system at a given point in time and within its contemporaneous borders.
11
This means that the information on the level of democracy in Germany in (say) 1930 will pertain to all territories that were part of Germany then, including for example the territory that is today Poland or Russia.
Maddison's German data for 1930, will, on the contrary, refer only to the income produced within what is currently German territory. More details regarding the merging of the two data sets is given in Milanovic (2005) . Figure 1 shows PolityIV data on democracy. Democracy is defined by the PolityIV variable called polity2 which is equal to the score for democracy minus the score for autocracy. Since the democracy variable 11 Being a member of the inter-state system is defined as being accepted as an independent entity either through membership of international organizations like League of Nations or United Nations or by being recognized as an independent entity by at least two major powers. The Polity definitions stems from the Correlates of War project (see Singer and Small, 1994) . Only entities with population greater than half-million are included in either Polity or Correlates of War databases.
ranges between 0 and +10, and autocracy likewise from 0 to +10, the polity2 variable varies between -10 (least democracy) to +10 (most democracy). After a steady increase in the democracy score up to mid-1920's, the average world democracy score began an equally steady decline in the inter-war period and then another one as various
Communist regimes and dictatorships in the newly independent countries came to power after the end of World War II. However the last twenty years have witnessed a major upswing in democracy so that its average level is now higher than at the previous peak in 1922. Variability in democracy scores has grown almost continuously from the 1850's to 1950's but has recently declined. In other words, country scores are now more similar than they were 20 or 30 years ago. The key factor that should help us distinguish between the Lipset and Przeworski-Limongi hypotheses is the entry-income, that is the income at which a country becomes a democracy. Under the Lipset hypothesis, there would be no entry below some threshold income and most countries would enter at some relatively high income. Obviously such a sharp discontinuity is unlikely to be observed in the real world where country-specific elements are always present: we would however expect to see the incidence of entry increasing in income.
If alternatively the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis is true then the distribution of entry-incomes should be exactly the same as the overall distribution of incomes in the world: if countries' incomes are distributed (say) lognormally, so should be the distribution of entry incomes. To quote Przeworski and Limongi (1997, p. 157) , "we…expect to observe democracies to appear randomly with regard to level of development".
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If becoming a democracy obeys non-income factors, then what country becomes a democracy is a random draw as far as income is concerned.
This can be written as (1)
which means that probability of entry into democracy of level i and at time t, conditional on income, is the same as the unconditional probability of entry into democracy (country subscript is omitted). 14 Consider for example income of entrants if the definition of democracy is taken to require a polity2 value greater than 5. We note (see Annex 1) that there are countries like Burma, Botswana and Niger that have entered democracy at income level less than $PPP 500 which is barely above subsistence. There are also countries that have entered democracy only 13 These are dollars of equal purchasing power (PPP) across countries.
14 The full list of entry-incomes and entry-years for polity2>5 and polity2>8 is given in Annex 1. per capita in excess $PPP8,000 that have never been democracies. The range of entrants' incomes is therefore very high and this would seem to argue against Lipset's hypothesis. 15 However, the high range of entrants' incomes does not, by itself, invalidate the hypothesis. To see this suppose that in the universe of country-incomes, there are many countries with very low incomes and only a few with high incomes; suppose further, following Lipset, that income matters for entry. There would be proportionally many more rich countries that are democracies but that does not exclude the possibility that some poor countries make it too.
What is important is whether probability of entry increases in income. But in order to know what is the probability of entry, we need to know what is the universe of country-incomes out of which "draws" into democracy are made. To this we turn next.
Our first relevant universe (called universe A) is composed of all countries' incomes in the years when there were entries into democracy (draws). For example, suppose that in years 1950, 1953, 1961, 1965 and 1970 , there was one entry each into democracy; then the relevant universe A will be composed of all country-incomes existing in those five years (save, of course, for countries that already are democracies). In a further complication, entries into democracy are not uniform across years: in some years, we may have only one entry, in others ten. The spikes at the time of the "democratic revolutions" at the end of World War 15 The same is true for any level of polity2 variable. If democracy is defined as polity2>8, the range of entrants' incomes goes from less than $PPP 600 to more than $14,000 (see Annex 1).
I and in 1990-91 are easily observable in Figure 3 . This is equivalent to having a variable number of draws in different years. Since the underlying country-income distributions are different in different years we need to adjust for this. We do so by giving greater weights to the underlying distributions in the years where there were more draws. Going back to our example, if the number of draws into democracy were twice as great in 1970 as in 1950, then the weight attached to the underlying distribution of countries' incomes in 1970 must be twice as high as for 1950. As mentioned, from these yearly distributions we exclude countries that are already democracies (according to whatever the definition of democracy is) since draws into new democracy cannot be made from these countries.
To conclude, the universe of country-incomes A is thus composed of country-incomes in all years where there were draws into democracy weighted by the number of draws and adjusted downward for countries that already are democracies. In other words, as we increase our polity2 cut-off level, the distribution of entry-incomes shifts much more to the right than the distribution of the income universe and the two distributions gradually become more dissimilar. Indeed the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which at low levels of democracy accepts (at 1 percent level) the hypothesis of equality of the two distributions, strongly rejects the hypothesis as soon as the polity2 cut-off reaches 5 (see Table 1 ). Notice an almost strict monotonic relationship: the hypothesis of equality of the two distributions is accepted This result is confirmed by the parametric tests of the means (Table   1) . Again, as the definition of democracy becomes more demanding, the means of entrants' incomes and universe A increasingly diverge with the former being greater (see t-values in Table 1 ). 16 We conclude that the less demanding our definition of democracy the more likely is the Przeworski hypothesis to be accepted. But for the more demanding definitions of democracy income level seems to play a significant role. The draws into democracy are no longer purely randomviz. they are associated with higher income. 16 The same results are obtained using probit regressions for the entry into democracy.
Income has no statistically significant effect (at 1 percent level) until polity2 values reaches 7 after which it is very strongly and positively associated with the probability of entry into democracy (see Annex 2 top table). 
where probability of entry into democracy of level i at time t is viewed as conditional not only on income but on the previously achieved level of democracy D h,t-1 (h<i). 17 The universe of incomes with which we are concerned now is not composed of all country-incomes at a given year but only of incomes of countries whose previously achieved level of democracy is the same as the previously achieved level of democracy of the new entrants. We call this universe B. If a given country enters democracy in year t, its income should not be-according to this argument-contrasted with incomes of all countries which in year t could have entered democracy but only with incomes of a subset of countries that had the same level of democracy as the entrant country. In this case, the probability of entry into democracy may be independent of income but may depend on the previous level of democracy (D t-1 ).
We test this hypothesis next. The entrants into democracy (for each level of polity2) remain the same as before, but the universe with which to 17 Previously achieved level of democracy is technically the same thing as one-period lagged democracy. We prefer the former term because it conveys more exactly from what point do countries move (or fail to move) to higher levels of democracy. compare their distribution changes. As an illustration, compare the distribution of entry incomes when democracy is defined as polity2>8 with the universes A and B. In Figure 5a (left panel), the comparator is the universe of all country-incomes, i.e., the universe A, while in Figure 5b (right panel) the comparator is the more restricted universe B. It is clear that while the two distributions are visually different in Figure 5a , the differences are much less in Figure 5b . In fact, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov hypothesis of equality of the two distributions is rejected in the former and accepted in the latter case. We conclude that if we control for the already achieved level of democracy, incomes of entrants into a higher level of democracy do not display either a statistically different distribution or the mean from the incomes of the countries who do not move to a higher level of democracy.
Consequently, conditional on the previously attained level of democracy, income does not seem to play a role in making countries more or less likely to accede to a higher level of democracy. We can write it more formally: Proposition 1. Countries that enter into higher levels of democracy are not a random draw from the universe of all country incomes; but countries that enter higher levels of democracy are a random draw from the joint distribution of previous level of democracy and income.
A reconciliation and a different hypothesis
How do we explain Proposition 1? Consider the following story.
Suppose that at some initial point in time all countries have the same low income, and that in terms of democracy they are randomly distributed reflecting a contingent nature of creation of democratic institutions as argued by Przeworski and Limongi. Let their growth be random with respect to democracy but such that Alpha countries do not grow at all and Beta countries do (at uneven rates). Assume further that Alpha's levels of democracy and of course income remain the same throughout time whilecrucially-the draws into higher democracy are made only from among the Beta countries. At each period, as Betas grow, some of them, will randomly (that is, independently of their income) accede to higher democracy levels and others will not. Our universe B will be composed of Beta countries only and the draws out of that universe will be random with respect to income. However, the universe A is composed both of stationary Alphas and the (unequally growing) Betas. The distribution of entrants' incomes will, when compared with the universe A, tend to be skewed to the right (toward richer countries) while, of course, it will be the same as the distribution of universe B. We obtain the results identical to what we have found here. The key factor is that entries into higher democracy are made from the growing countries only, but once the countries are growing the draws are indeed random.
This explanation is illustrated in Figure 6 . incomes is different (skewed toward higher income countries) from the distribution of incomes in the universe A. This is possible only because incomes in the "excluded" area (universe A exclusive of universe B, that is, A~B) are systematically lower than incomes in the B areas.
To summarize, we deal with three kinds of countries:
(ii) countries that did not enter democracy but had the same D t-1 as those that did (universe B) (iii) countries that did not enter democracy and did not have the same D t-1 as any of the countries that entered democracy. They are the "excluded" countries. We move now to the study of this hypothesis. First, we confirm that the "excluded" countries have lower income on average and different distribution (skewed to the left) than the entrants into democracy or universe B. 19 However is their prior democratic achievement (D t-1 ) lower too? We do not know that because countries acceding to higher levels of democracy could have had come from relatively high or relatively low democracy countries. To see how this is possible, look at the universe B when democracy is defined to be higher than polity2 value of d 3 ( Figure   6 ). Countries from which the new entrants into d 3 were recruited had previously achieved democracy levels of d 1 and d 2 . But we do not know if these levels were relatively high or low, and correspondingly if the 19 We check that using the same tests of distributions and the means as before. We find that the hypothesis of the equality of incomes between the "excluded" country/years and the entrants into democracy is rejected (results available from the author on request).
Entrants into higher level of democracy (d 3 )
"excluded" countries had, on average, democracy levels that were greater or lower than d 1 or d 2 . 20 We study this in Table 3 which compares democracy levels of "excluded" countries and universe B. The interpretation of the results as follows. Consider democracy to be polity2
>1. In the years where there were draws into democracy, let the entrants' previously achieved levels of democracy by be x, y and z. All countries (whether they entered or not democracy) with such levels are part of universe B. On average, the universe B was characterized by D t-1 equal to -2.9 (Table 3 ). How about the excluded countries? They were, on average, significantly less democratic than the universe B countries. Their mean D t-1 was -6.29 (and different from -2.9 at less than 0.1 percent level of significance). The difference between the two means steadily increases as we raise the bar for our definition of democracy. For example, when democracy is defined as polity2>8, the universe B was composed of countries with the previous (past year's) average democracy score of 5. The excluded countries' average score was only -2.7. 20 We know that they could not have had levels d 1 or d 2 since they would not be "excluded" then. The results are the same if we use non-parametric testing. Figure 7 illustrates the big difference in the achieved democracy levels prior to the accession to two different levels of democracy. For example, if democracy=polity2>5, most of the entrants had prior democracy scores of 5 or just under 5. But more than eighty percent of the excluded countries had previous democracy levels below zero with the mode being -8 and the median -7. We conclude that the "excluded" countries are both poorer on average and with significantly lower past achievement of democracy that the universe B countries, that is, the countries from among whom the recruitment into democracy is made.
Which are the excluded countries? This would of course vary with our definition of democracy. As an example consider polity2>5 to be the definition of democracy, and limit the data to the period after 1950. . 22 The list is given in Table 4 . Several of them (Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia) were excluded from all thirty draws. They never came close to being recruitment candidates for democracy. 22 We can visualize entries into democracy as annual lotteries. Suppose that black men, black women, white men, and white women participate. In some years, no one wins the prize, in other years, some members from two groups (say, black women and white men) win. To be excluded in one year means that no one from a given group (say, black men) has won. But if this continues year after year, that group (black men) will indeed feel quite excluded. If one is a black men, he would feel excluded not solely because he has failed to win (many people did) but because no one from your group ever did. As we can see, these are generally poor countries (with the exception of two oil-rich kingdoms) with low democracy scores. The unweighted 2001 mean GDI per capita for this group is $PPP 3,050 which is less than half of world average in the same year, and their mean polity2 value is -3.1 compared to the world average of 3. However, being excluded is not an immutable fate as we can see from the examples of Guatemala and Indonesia which respectively in 1998 and 1999 acceded to democracy.
Conclusions
The objective was to investigate the effects of income (and implicitly income growth) on accession to democracy. The paper uses two long-term data series which have only recently become available and combines them in a new fashion. It also departs from some other tests done previously because it emphasizes non-parametric testing. and higher than those of the countries that fail to democratize. The monotonic relationship between the increase in the level of democracy and rejection of the Przeworski-Limongi hypothesis is quite unambiguous.
However, if in addition to a simple probability of entry into democracy conditional on income, we posit that the entry is conditional also on the previously achieved level of democracy, we find that income no longer plays a role in the selection of countries that enter democracy.
This holds for practically all levels of democracies. In other words. the role of income in "helping" entry into democracy seems to vanish once we control for the previously achieved level of democracy.
How do we reconcile these two different findings? We argue that the results imply that there is a subgroup of "excluded" countries that exhibit both low levels of income and democracy. They are defined not simply by the fact that they have failed to enter democracy (defined as, say, polity2 value of 5 or 6 or 7), but that no country with their level of democratic achievement has succeeded in acceding to polity2>5 or polity2>6 etc. In other words, these countries are significantly different from the set of countries from which the recruitment into democracy is made. Obviously, a country need not be "excluded" throughout all the years. In some years, another country with the same low level of previous democratic achievement can accede to democracy. But this is unusual. Now, from the other group of countries from which the draws into democracy are made, the entries into democracy are income-random.
There is thus a major discontinuity or the split in the sample. Income both matters and does not matter. It matters because low income is probably the reason why the "excluded countries" are unable to improve their democracy levels and move to a group of countries wherefrom the recruitment into democracy is made. But, on the other hand, income does not matter for other countries' accession to higher democracy levels since the accession occurs randomly. Note: Coefficient significant at less than 1 percent level shaded. GDI per capita is in logs.
